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I. INTRODUCTION, EXPOSURE TO THE EXPOSURE
The Smiths are a married couple who own a home in Florida. A few
years ago, after working hard all of their lives, the Smiths decided to
retire and purchase their dream home across the street from the beach.
Like the Smiths, an estimated 11.2 million people, over 65% of the
state's population, have moved into Florida's coastal regions in the last
half century.' Along with the population increase, property values along
the coast have been skyrocketing.2 From a state's perspective, increases
in population and property values are usually positive occurrences.
However, this is not so when considered from a different point of view.
The increased number of structures, each with an increased value, have
created new and unprecedented levels of hurricane exposure. Though
the Smiths love their house and they are able to afford the insurance,
they are truly scared now. They are scared because they are Florida
homeowners and an unnatural disaster is brewing.
"[S]tate officials [in Florida] have conceded [that] they would be
billions of dollars short in their own catastrophe coverage if a severe
hurricane hits Florida." 3 Florida officials have also determined that in a
worst-case scenario, a single hurricane could cause as much as $198.99
billion in total damage.4 Furthermore, Florida is often hit by multiple
hurricanes in a single year. Florida has rolled the dice, and if Mother
Nature calls her number in the next few years, then only one question
remains: Who will pay?
The Smith family is not scared of the storm's damage, but they are
fearful of not being able to collect on their hurricane insurance policy5
even though they have fulfilled all of their obligations. After all, the
purpose of hurricane insurance is to give customers some sense of
assurance that they will be made whole in the event of any storm
damage. 6
1. JEFFREY ZINN, COASTAL DEMOGRAPHICS AND DEVELOPMENT PATTERNS, H.R. Doc. No.

97-588, available at http://ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/briefingbooks/oceans/j.cfm (last visited
Jan. 24,2010).
2. Michael Peltier, Florida Passes $12 Billion Property Tax Cut Plan, REUTERS, Oct.
29, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSN2955068420071029.
3. Jim Turner, U.S. Sen. Bill Nelson Wants FederalAidjor Florida in Event of Natural
Catastrophe, TREASURE COAST PALM, Feb. 27, 2009, at All, available at http://www.tcpalm.

com/news/2009/feb/27/us-sen-bill-nelson-wants-florida-get-ederal-aid-e/.
4.

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF A 1-IN-A-100

YEAR HURRICANE 2 (2009) [hereinafter DFS REPORT].

5. In practice "hurricane insurance" is a fiction, but for the purpose of this Article,
"hurricane insurance" refers to hurricane-related insurance, which most commonly includes
multiperil homeowner's insurance, windstorm insurance, casualty insurance, and covers other
minor forms of property insurance as well. "Hurricane insurance" as used in this Article does
not encompass flood insurance.
6. Sara Elizabeth Graditor, Responsibility for the Restoration of the Hurricane
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Part II of this Article explains the Smiths' dilemma by focusing on
the broad political and policy considerations. The political section
examines the natural tendency of the government to artificially lower
rates for short-run political gain using the 2004 and 2005 hurricane
seasons as the prime example. The policy section considers how the
state could treat its insurance problems by examining the big five
decisions: (1) private market led versus government led insurance
systems, (2) pre-event funding versus post-event funding, (3) actuarially
sound rates versus artificially low rates, (4) isolated insurance
assessments versus broad insurance assessments, and (5) in-state
controlled versus federally controlled hurricane insurance.
Part III explains the realistic fear felt by the Smiths and millions of
other coastal property owners in Florida by breaking down the unnatural
disaster from start to finish. This section shows how these problems
began and how they spiraled out of control, putting Florida where it is
today. This section also examines each of the three main pillars of the
problem: (1) the state-run Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund (the Cat
Fund), (2) the state-run Citizens Property Insurance Corporation
(Citizens), and (3) the heavily regulated private insurance market.
As of May 2009, the Cat Fund, Florida's own government
reinsurance program, has only $18 billion to cover $29 billion of its
obligations, a gaping $11.4 billion hole of liability.7 Citizens, the
government insurer of "last resort," has its own problems. After years of
artificially low rates, Citizens has assumed excessive risk by insuring
almost one-third of Florida's residential insurance market. The last
problem comes from the private insurance market, where after years of
strong government price caps, State Farm Insurance, Florida's largest
private insurer, as well as other insurers, have announced their plans to
cancel all property insurance policies in Florida. 9 The unnatural disaster
is already set. The only ingredient missing is the next major hurricane, a
likely occurrence for a state that historically receives 47% of all

InsuranceIndustry: Business Proposalor State Solution?, 31 NOVA L. REv. 527, 536 (2007).
7.

Paige St. John, CAT Fund is Facing a CriticalShortfall, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB.,

Feb. 8, 2009, at B1,
available at http://www.theledger.com/article/20090207/NEWS/
902070346/1410?Title=FlasHurricaneCatastrophe Is Fund inJeopardy. The Cat Fund
currently has around $18 billion, including $10.6 billion in pre-event assets to cover reinsurance
payments, and $7 billion from private insurance company deductibles, which are required to pay
for the first part of catastrophic losses. Id. There are some predictions that the Cat Fund would
be able to raise $3 billion in post-event bonding as well, but this is not calculated into the
equation due to its speculatory nature. Id.
8.

DFS REPORT, supra note 4, at 16.

9.

Id.
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hurricanes.' 0 Moreover, based on the 2009 Atlantic Hurricane Season,
experts are estimating that fourteen named storms and seven hurricanes
will develop this year, including three major hurricanes." The last
subpart fleshes out the magnitude and the combined effect of these
problems predicting what would happen to the state in a worst-case
scenario, such as if another category five Hurricane Andrew were to
chum through one of Florida's major population areas.
Part IV offers a contrasting view to the current Florida model by
spotlighting South Carolina's conservative insurance model, which
predominantly relies on the private market to handle its insurance
problems. This section looks at four policies that South Carolina
implements to sustain the private market system: (1) preserve the staterun insurer as a true insurer of last resort, (2) offer tax exemptions for
private insurers willing to cover the riskiest properties, (3) offer tax
exemptions to individual citizens to encourage hurricane preparation,
and (4) avoid a state-run reinsurance program.
Part V proposes a glide path of reforms that would create a
sustainable insurance system for Florida while minimizing the pains of
time-consuming implementation. This model would balance Florida's
unique priorities by preserving low insurance rates and moderate control
while offering sustainability. Specifically, the glide path consists of
three core policy shifts. The first shift restricts the Cat Fund's coverage
obligations to $16 billion. The second returns Citizens to its original
function as an insurer of last resort to prevent it from competing with
the private sector. The third shift reduces government regulation of
private market rates to encourage competition and allow the free market
to regulate prices.
Part VI explores the emergency assistance that the federal
government may provide to Florida if a major catastrophe occurs in the
next few years. Given the current political realities, the question of
national assistance is more of a question of how than if Specifically,
there are three proposed national solutions presently under
consideration inside the Capitol Building.
The first solution is to provide ad hoc national assistance, in which
the President would contribute a small amount of federal money to help
10. Interview with Mark Delegal, Legal Counsel for State Farm Ins. Co., Partner for
Pennington, Moore, Wilkinson, Bell & Dunbar Law Firm (Mar. 27, 2009) [hereinafter Delegal
Interview].
I1. Associated Press, First-09 HurricaneForecastPredicts Busy Time (Dec. 10, 2008),
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28161667/. "Major hurricane" is defined as a
category three or higher, which requires having a maximum wind speed of at least 111 mph.
Atlantic Oceanographic and Meteorological Laboratory, Hurricane Research Division
Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/tcfaq/A3.html (last visited Jan. 24,
2010).
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the state pay for catastrophic damages. In extreme catastrophes, such as
Hurricane Katrina, Congress can approve much more. Due to
Congress's political nature and lack of accountability, this is the least
desirable option. The second solution is a national catastrophe fund that
would operate like a reinsurance pool similar to Florida's Cat Fund.
This plan passed both the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S.
Senate in 2008, but failed due to President Bush's veto threat.12
However, a new national catastrophe fund is currently being proposed
in the House, and with a new President, a different result is possible.
The third solution, the national bridge loan, is the most attractive option
because it would provide a depoliticized federal backstop in the form of
a low-interest bridge loan that a user state would be required to pay
back. To establish this line of credit, Florida is currently lobbying the
U.S. Treasury, the Federal Reserve Bank, Congress, and President
Obama.
This Article finds that Florida's hurricane insurance system was in
its darkest hour going into the 2009 hurricane season. The problems are
set and the risks are real, so if a major hurricane hits Florida, it is
unclear whether the Smith family would be able to collect from their
insurance claim. The thrust of this Article highlights Florida's current
problems and demonstrates the need for immediate, modest, and
sustainable reform. Though Florida has progressed in a more political
and riskier direction, there may be enough time for reform. The solution
is to implement a glide path of reforms that afford marginal changes
each year to achieve long-term sustainability. This conservative reform
will eventually happen. The real question is whether the pendulum will
swing back before, or after, the next major hurricane. In other words,
will the unnatural disaster be defused in time?
II. BACKGROUND, THE POLITICS AND POLICIES BEHIND THE
UNNATURAL DISASTER

A. The Politics
Hurricanes have been striking the state long before it was ever called
Florida, but never before has Florida been in such a vulnerable position.
Florida took on the 2009 hurricane season without sufficient resources
to uphold its financial obligations. The state has lost much of its control
over the financial problem. As this Article's title states, this is Florida's
unnatural disaster. The disaster arose because it is often politically
12. Commission on Natural Catastrophe Risk Management and Insurance Act of 2008,
H.R. 3121, 110th Cong. (2008), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill
h 110-3121 [hereinafter H.R. 3121].
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popular to lower hurricane insurance rates in the short-term. High
insurance rates following a major hurricane are often the warning sign
that the state legislators will soon develop a reactionary policy to
temporarily lower rates.
The underlying problem that everyone can agree on is that hurricane
insurance rates in Florida's coastal regions are currently exorbitant, and
many people cannot afford to live around the coast. However, the next
question begins the divide in opinion: Should Florida tell those who
cannot afford living on the coast to move, or should the state offer some
assistance to those property owners? The attitude of some is that "if you
cannot afford the cost . . . you should move."'

3

The solution sounds

simple: If it is expensive to live in a risky area and you cannot afford the
property, then do not buy it.
This seemingly simple proposition is surprisingly intricate.
Specifically, three problems exist with this approach. First, people who
are currently living in their coastal residences do not want to move.
Second, if hurricane insurance is too expensive, some people will
choose not to purchase it. If played out on a large scale, then a single
hurricane could cause Florida's homeless population to increase by
thousands or even millions. Third, a widespread lack of insurance
coverage would likely cause another housing slump in Florida. In the
words of retired Florida State Senator Skip Campbell:
We are going to have a major crisis statewide with people that
can[not] afford property insurance rates and that [is] going to
create a crisis in multiple sectors of our economy. [P]eople will
not be able to sell their houses because there won't be buyers
because buyers can[not] afford to pay the taxes and insurance.
So, the banks are going to hurt, the mortgage companies are
going to hurt, [the] real estate agents are going to hurt, and [the]
general economy is going to start hurting because we will not
have people who can, in fact, live in our communities to perform
the jobs that we need; such as teaching, such as police officers,
[and] this is going to go one level even further down because we
are seeing some of the commercial property owners having the
same problems as the residential community, which is they're
getting hit with increased property taxes and almost astronomical
property insurance rates. So, what do they do? [They increase

Editorial, State Should Take a Role in Bolstering Citizens Insurance, LAKELAND
Dec. 29, 2005, available at http://www.fldfs.com/PressOffice/Documents/State%20
Should%20Take%20A%2ORole%20in%2Bolstering%/o20Citizens%2Olnsurance I 229.htm.
13.

LEDGER,

2010]

FLORIDA'S UNNATURAL DISASTER: WHO WILL PAY FOR THE NEXT HURRICANE?

153

rent.] This is the beginning of the problem and it's more farreaching than anybody can ever think about.14
Because hurricane insurance helps coastal residents as well as the
overall state economy, Florida has a strong interest in protecting its
valuable coastal property. On this premise, Florida has increased
government control to ensure coastal property stays protected. The big
question remains: How much assistance is necessary? 5
All of these political interests played out in the aftermath of the 2004
and 2005 hurricane seasons. Between 2004 and 2005, eight named
storms pounded the Florida Peninsula.' 6 Many insurance companies
went out of business, and the remaining companies decided to stay alive
by severely increasin rates. 17 Soon after, insurance customers
responded with outrage.
About the same time, the 2006 gubernatorial and state legislative
election campaigns were getting underway.' 9 Governor Charlie Crist
and many other politicians realized that a promise to lower hurricane
insurance rates in the short-term would provide a big campaign boost in
the heavily populated coastal regions.20
Almost immediately after being sworn in, Governor Crist called for
a special legislative session to reduce insurance premium rates.2 1 That
special session marked a huge shift in Florida's regulation of the
insurance industry. 22 As a result, in 2007, Florida's hurricane insurance
system became too risky, setting the unnatural disaster in motion and
causing our current problems.
B. The Policy Considerations
In this section, the author seeks to determine the most effective way
for the state to assist coastal property owners with the expense of
hurricane insurance. Here, the threshold issue is whether the state's
14. Graditor, supra note 6, at 537-38.
15. The answer to this question depends on one's opinion about the importance of the
coastal regions to Florida. This is a question that the state legislature has debated for decades,
and will probably continue for many more decades.
16. Florida Insurance Council, CAT Fund: Claims-Paying Crisis Looms, Florida
Insurance Council Whitepaper, available at http://www.flains.org/index.php?option=com
content&view-article&id=1574:claims-paying-cris-looms-for-floida-hurricane-catastrophe-fun
e&catid=904:property-insurance-background& Itemid=38.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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insurance system should be led by the private sector, or the public
sector. The former is an attractive choice because the trade practices of
the private insurance market have clear-cut and definitive requirements.
Although no Southeastern coastal state has ceded absolute control to the
private market, South Carolina has come close.
In contrast, states like Florida, where government leadership of the
insurance system is the reigning philosophy, find it difficult to define
the insurance system. Such states must answer four major questions.
First, pre-event funding versus post-event funding: Should the
government gather the necessary financial assets before or after the
hurricane? Although not having sufficient assets on hand at the time of
the storm is risky, the government has the ability to raise funds postevent through bonding and emergency assessments, a pseudo-tax of
sorts. 2 3 Florida allows itself to cover a large Fortion of its insurance
requirements with the pay-it-later philosophy. 4 To the contrary, the
private insurance market requires sufficient assets to be set aside preevent. 25
Second, actuarially sound rates versus artificially low rates: Should
the government charge rates below what the scientific actuarial risk
models demand, instead of charging rates in proportion to their
respective risk? When the government does not charge adequate rates
for the risk being assumed, the government still accepts the same
amount of risk without investing appropriately. If the expected risk is
converted into damage, the government will then have to seek
additional capital through the post-event funding to cover the
difference. Florida has kept insurance rates in the public and private
sector artificially low for multiple years.2 6 In contrast, the central tenet
of the private insurance market is to charge actuarially sound rates;
otherwise, companies would go out of business.
Third, isolated insurance assessments versus state-wide insurance
assessments: Should the government charge only those who purchase
hurricane insurance, or should the government charge other types of
insurance customers, such as a person who only has auto insurance?
The State of Florida chooses to subsidize the cost of government-run
hurricane insurance by making other types of insurance customers
pay.27 Conversely, in the private insurance market, customers only pay
for the type of risk they choose to cover.

23. See generallyid.
24. See generallyid
25. Delegal Interview, supra note 10. The government actually requires private insurance
companies to set aside a sufficient amount of assets. Id.
26. See generallyFlorida Insurance Council, supra note 16.
27. See generally id.

2010]

FLORIDA 'S UNNATURAL DISASTER: WHO WILL PAY FOR THE NEXT HURRICANE?

155

Fourth, in-state controlled catastrophe insurance versus federally
controlled catastrophe insurance: Once it is decided that government
assistance is appropriate, how many levels of government should
provide assistance? If the federal government steps in, the risk spreads
to all American taxpayers instead of Floridians alone. Currently, the
government does not intercede into the states' insurance policies, but
Florida is lobbying to change this, as this Article later explores.2 8
A government-run hurricane insurance system creates additional
peril. In Florida, the risks have grown to a literally uncontrollable level
due to a series of precarious decisions made by Florida's politicians.
These decisions include the implementation of a government-led
insurance system, post-event funding, artificially low insurance rates,
and state-wide hurricane assessments. These policy decisions define the
next section of this Article.
III. FLORIDA'S OPTIMISTIC MODEL, THE MECHANICS OF THE
UNNATURAL DISASTER

This section is where the political decisions and policy decisions
meet reality. In 2009, there were three pillars on which the Florida
hurricane insurance system stands on, and each of those pillars currently
has a major problem. This section breaks down all three pillars in detail,
covering the Cat Fund, Citizens, and the private insurance market. This
section also fleshes out the combined effect of these problems in a
hypothetical worst-case scenario hurricane.
A. FloridaHurricaneCatastropheFund
The Cat Fund, which provides insurance for insurance companies, is
Florida's government-run reinsurance pool. 29 Hurricanes are not steady
forms of risk, so to help Florida's insurance companies cover the
rougher than expected hurricane seasons, the Cat Fund provides aid in
the form of reimbursement. 30 The Cat Fund works by taking annual
premiums from primary insurers in return for a portion of their
catastrophic hurricane losses.31 Predetermined formulas establish
reimbursement amounts and are only issued once a certain amount of
28. Florida Cabinet Meeting, State Bd. of Admin. Asset Update, (Apr. 28, 2009)
(Statement of Ash Williams, Executive Dir. of the State Bd. of Admin.).
29. Tom Zucco, Property Insurance: Still Living in Fear of the Really Big One, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 2, 2008, available at http://www.sptimes.com/2008/03/02/Opinion/

Property_insuranceS.shtml.
30. Richard C. Mason et al., Recent Developments in Excess, Surplus Lines, and
Reinsurance,43 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 375, 405-06 (2008).
3 1. Id.
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damage occurs. 32 This system keeps the insurance rates low by
spreading the risk.
The Cat Fund was born of Hurricane Andrew's devastation; the
name still incites fear in many Floridians. Hurricane Andrew ripped
through Florida in August of 1992 with winds up to 180 miles-per-hour
destroying more than 60,000 homes in a matter of hours, leaving as
many as a quarter of a million people homeless. 34 By the time Hurricane
Andrew had passed, it left $40 billion in destruction and damage. 35 This
storm alone bankrupted ten property insurers. 36 Many of the remaining
insurers stopped signing new policies, and some reduced existing
policies.3 7 At that time, Hurricane Andrew was the costliest natural
disaster in America's history. 38
Still reeling from the damage, the Florida Legislature convened an
emergency special session to search for a solution. The result was the
Cat Fund, which provided up to $16 billion to the state's residential
hurricane insurers following major storm damage. 39 As of 2008, Florida
was only one of the two states to have a government-run catastrophe
40
fund, though seven other states are exploring similar programs.
The Cat Fund receives funding from three sources: (1) participating
insurers paying reimbursement premiums, (2) investment earnings from
those premiums, and (3) emergency assessments that charge insurance
41
customers in order to cover revenue bonds issued by the Cat Fund.
One of the main revenue sources is the insurance companies. The
state-backed Citizens and private insurers covering property damage are

32. Florida Insurance Council, supra note 16.
33. FLA. STAT. § 215.555(1)(e) (2009). The Cat Fund was designed to be "a stable and
ongoing source of reimbursement to insurers for a portion of their catastrophic hurricane losses
[that] will create additional insurance capacity sufficient to ameliorate the current dangers to the
state's economy." Id.
34. Jonathon Brennan Butler, Insurers Under Fire: Assessing The Constitutionality of
Florida'sResidential Property Insurance Moratorium After Hurricane Andrew, 22 FLA. ST.
U.L. REv. 731, 731-32 (1995).
35. Ken Kaye & Robin Benedick, What if HurricaneAndrew Hit South Florida Today?,
S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 24, 2002, available at http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/weather/
hurricane/sfl-sandrew24aug24,0,1246678.story. Forty billion dollars is adjusted for 2002 value
of money. Id. "In an instant, Hurricane Andrew inflicted almost twice as much monetary loss in
hurricane claims as insurers had collected in premiums in Florida over the past twenty years."
Butler, supra note 34, at 733.
36. Butler, supra note 34, at 733.
37. Id. at 733-34.
38. Id. at 732.
39. See Florida Insurance Council, supra note 16.
40. John Gramlich, McCain, GOP Governors Split Over DisasterFund, INS. J., June 19,
2008, availableat http://www.insurancejoumal.com/news/national/2008/06/19/91157.htm.
41. Mason et al., supra note 30, at 406.
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both required to purchase reinsurance from the Cat Fund.42 The second
income source is the interest accruing from those assets. The final
revenue source comes from politically unpopular assessments, also
commonly called "hurricane taxes." If the Cat Fund is short on
resources, then assessments are made on most insurance policies in the
state, including homeowner's, business, and auto insurance.43 These
assessments cover the cost of the bonds that the Cat Fund issues to meet
its financial obligations."
The Cat Fund worked relatively well from 1993 until the 2004-2005
hurricane seasons. 45 Those two seasons caused the Cat Fund to plummet
into debt and issue post-event assessments, which are still being paid
off.46 Those two seasons also brought politically unpopular high
insurance rates. Just as the Cat Fund began to show signs that it might
be taking on too much risk, Florida's politicians decided to increase the
risk of the Cat Fund, in order to reduce rates. The state promised to
provide another $13 billion in reimbursements on top of the current $16
billion in the'event of a major storm.4 7 This new $29 billion dollar
responsibility made the Cat Fund too risky. Florida now retains nearly
two-thirds of the risk for reinsured property within its own borders. This
practice contradicts the central tenet of insurance, "spreading the risk."4 8
More problems with the Cat Fund began to show when the subprime mortgage lending crisis began to unfold. By late fall of 2007,
financial advisors for the Cat Fund warned that the Cat Fund may not be
able to meet its obligations.4 9 In 2008, it took repeated attempts before
the Cat Fund was able to secure only $3.5 billion in bond sales after
attempting to sell $7 billion.50 To patch the state's exposure, the Cat
Fund squeaked by after purchasing the last $4 billion of reinsurance
needed from Berkshire Hathaway Investment Company at a cost of
$224 million to all of Florida's tax payers.5

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Florida Insurance Council, supra note 16.
45. . Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. This expansion provided more relief for property insureds, while knowingly
placing the additional risk on the general taxpayers in the event that the fund does not meet its
demand in the wake of another major storm. Id.
48. The Florida Cat Fund, Reinsurance Association of America, http://www.natcatus.
org/Content/TheFloridaCatFund.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2008).
49. Florida Insurance Council, supra note 16.
50. Id.
51. Brent Kallestad, Florida Officials SearchingFor Ways to Back Up HurricaneFund,
INs. J., Mar. 12, 2009, available at http://www.insurancejoumal.com/news/southeast/2009/03/
12/98616.htm.
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The 2006, 2007, and 2008 hurricane seasons were relatively quiet
and did not test the Cat Fund with any new reimbursements. 52 At the
start of the 2009 hurricane season, the Cat Fund was in more trouble
than ever.5 3 The trick that made the Cat Fund work was the issuance of
pre-event and post-event bonds to meet the necessary capacity.
However, in 2009, in the midst of an economic recession, the possibility
of issuing a large amount of bonds is not realistic. 54 The smoke and
mirror techniques are beginning to be revealed as the risk from the
short-term decisions accumulate, and Florida's own politicians now
admit that the Cat Fund cannot cover the risk that they promised."
What started as the silver bullet to prevent another Hurricane Andrew
seems to have grown into a false pillar of support that may now cause
exponentially more damage if the whole Hurricane insurance market
collapses in Florida.
B. Citizens PropertyInsurance Corporation
Citizens was originally designed to be an insurer of "last resort" for
those property owners who lived in the riskiest areas and could not
56
attain coverage in the private market. For many reasons, the private
insurance market is not interested in some properties, so the state offers
insurance to these properties to provide some protection. The general
concept of Citizens has existed in Florida since 1970 in different
forms.57 Similar programs are found in all hurricane-prone southeastern
52. Larry Thornberry, Property Insurance Reform, FLA. REAL EST. J., Feb. 12, 2009,
availableat http://www.frej.net/news/column/2009-02-12/property-insurance-reform.
53. St. John, supra note 7.
54. Thornberry, supra note 52. Just when Floridians were suffering from a recession, they
also run the risk of not having their insurance coverage reinsured by the state. "Under current
economic conditions hardly anyone is buying bonds. In the words of veteran Florida lobbyist
Gene Adams, "Bonding capacity is a real issue. Who would buy these bonds, and what effect
would it have on the bond rating in the state? It could affect our ability to sell bonds for other
things like building roads." Id.
55. Beatrice Garcia, Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund Under Scrutiny, MIAMI
HERALD, Mar. 28, 2009. In addition, with a potential Cat Fund failure on the horizon, insurance
consumers are losing confidence that they will be paid for their losses. Furthermore, credit
rating companies see the potential failure as well, and are threatening to downgrade the credit
scores for all of Florida's insurance companies, causing insurance rates to go up. Id.
56. Insurance Information Institute, Florida Citizens Property Insurance Corporation,at
2, available at http://server.iii.org/yy_objdata/binary/797335_1_0/FloridaCitizens08.pdf (last
visited Jan. 24, 2010).
57. Florida Insurance Council, supra note 16. Citizens was formed in 2002 by combining
two previous state-run insurers into one.
The latter of those entities, the Florida Windstorm Underwriting Association
was created in 1970 for the purpose of covering wind risk in the Florida Keys.
In the years since, it was expanded to most of Florida's 35 coastal counties to
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states spanning from Texas to North Carolina.5 8
The operation of Citizens was uneventful until the 2004-2005
hurricane seasons, which effectively bankrupted the organization in
both years. 59 The bailout required $715 million from the state's general
tax revenue in addition to three separate state-wide assessments.6 0
Having failed twice, legislators reported to Tallahassee in 2006
determined to fix Citizens once and for all.6 1 By requirin actuarially
adequate rates, the legislators achieved short-lived success.
However, the underlying problem remained, consumer outrage and
political opposition to paying fair-value property insurance was still as
strong as ever.63 The new legislation would have increased Citizens'
rates by seventy-five percent, and Citizens' customers politically
refused to accept those rates. 64
Since that outcry, the legislature has altered three major policies,
effectively recreating Citizens for the worse.6 5 The first change
expanded Citizens' assessment targets, allowing Citizens to impose
assessments on most forms of insurance, similar to the Cat Fund. The
second change returned Citizens to an artificial balance by subsidizing
Citizens' rates for its 1.3 million coastal customers, thus reversing the
legislation passed just months before. 66 Citizens' rates have been legally
frozen since 2006, and those rates will continue to be locked in until at
least January 1, 2010.67 Against the advice of Citizens' staff, the
legislature decided to underfund Citizens' risk, thus creating future
problems.
provide Florida residents adequate wind coverage when it was unavailable in
the insurance market place. The Florida Residential Property and Casualty Joint
Underwriting Association, commonly known as the JUA, was created in a
special session of the Florida Legislature in December 1992, only months after
Hurricane Andrew ripped through South Florida....
Id.
58. Eli Lehrer, South Carolina's Omnibus Coastal Insurance Reform Legislation, Baby
Steps in the Right Direction, 11 COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST., at 3, Oct. 2007, available at
http://cei.org/pdf/ 6201.pdf.
59. Florida Insurance Council, supra note 16.
60. Id.
6 1. Id.
62. Id. "[A]ctuarially adequate rates" are determined by the same one-in-a hundred-year
storm maximum loss standards that private insurance companies use. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Citizens Available to More Residents, PALM BEACH POST, May 25, 2008,
available at http://findarticles.com/p/news-articles/plam-beach-post/mi_8163/is_20080525/
citizens-residents/ai n51996606/.
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The last change allowed Citizens to aggressively compete with
68
private insurers. This new law allowed coastal homeowners to choose
Citizens over a private insurer when Citizens is the least expensive
alternative.69 This transformed Citizens into a competitive insurer that
happens to be run and backed by the state. 70
The combined effect of Citizens issuing artificially low rates,
subsidizing the difference through non-Citizens insurance customers,
and allowing customers to choose a government insurer over a private
one has made the organization stunningly popular among its customers.
Since the 2006 reforms, the private insurance market has begun to
secede from the riskier coastal properties because there is no way to
compete with Citizens.71 "In 2002, the government insurer had a total
property exposure of $148 billion. As of May 2008, the organization is
responsible for property exposure of more than $440 billion. Never
before has one insurance company in Florida carried so much risk." 72
As of 2009, Citizens was Florida's largest property insurer, covering
almost one third of the state's coastal homeowners. 73 Because the
government insurer has tripled in size, its problems have exponentially
increased.
C. PrivateInsuranceMarket
Political support for artificially lower insurance rates is as strong in
the private market as it is for Citizens. For thirty years, Florida has
forced insurance companies to offer low insurance rates through rate
price caps. 74 All rate changes must get the stamp of approval from the

68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
The competition does not stop there. Homeowners currently with Citizens have
the option to reject a "takeout" offer from private insurers if staying with
Citizens would be cheaper for them. Applicants seeking coverage can qualify
for Citizens even if they have an offer for private market coverage if the private
insurer premium is fifteen percent or greater of the Citizens premium.
Florida Insurance Council, supra note 16.
71. Florida Insurance Council, supra note 16.
72. Citizens Available to More Residents, supra note 67.
73. Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, Presentation to House Insurance, Business
& FinancialAffairs Policy Committee, Feb. 3, 2009, at 4, availableat https://www.citizensfla.
com/shared/documents/HIC-Presentation-Feb2009.pdf Citizens covers 27% of Florida's
property owners. Id.
74. Interview with Rep. Alan Hays, Rep. of the Florida House, District 25 (Mar. 27,
2009) [hereinafter Hays Interview].
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Office of Insurance Regulation (OIR).75 The Director of the OIR, Kevin
McCarty, was appointed by Governor Crist, and in the words of
Representative Hays, "the director is nothing more than the Governor's
puppet.", As a result, the OIR currently follows the orders of a man
who became governor by promising Florida he would artificially lower
property insurance rates.
Specifically, OIR reviews all private insurers in the state to ensure
that rates are not "excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory"
using fourteen factors.77 Many of Florida's residents have argued that
the decision to pay insurance rates should be theirs, rather than the
state's. Private insurance companies concur, and a few insurers have
already left the state due to the restrictive rate caps.78
The state's current battle of rate regulation is most notably being
played out with State Farm. "A hurricane didn't prompt State Farm to
pull out of Florida's frail property insurance market, but the
ramifications are hitting like a Category 5."79 On January 27, 2009,
State Farm, the insurance giant, announced it would be cancelling "its
1.2 million homeowner policies in Florida, citing the state's punishing
price controls."so The action played out after State Farm's proposal for a
47% rate increase and that decision was upheld by an administrative law
judge. Because of its declining surplus and inability to raise rates,
State Farm claimed it had no other options. 82 State Farm specifically
cites over-restrictive rate caps as the reason for its failure, admitting that
it was continuously losing $20 million each month and was on pace to
become insolvent in its Florida operations by 2011.83

75. Id. Though Florida uses government involvements as an alternative to the private
market in the first two pillars of the Florida insurance system, the third pillar is arguably the
most intrusive because it directly controls prices for private business. Id.
76. Id.
77. FLA. STAT. § 627.062(2)(b) (2009). The flagship factor for hurricane-related
insurance is based on the results from the Florida Commission on Hurricane Loss Projection
Methodology, which heavily relies on expert evaluations of computer models to determine
appropriate rates. FLA. STAT. § 627.0628(1) (2009).
78. Florida'sUnnaturalDisaster,infra note 80.
79. Jeff Harrington & Jennifer Liberto, State Farm to Halt Property Insurance, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 28, 2009, availableat http://www.tampabay.com/news/article971104.
ece.
80. Editorial, Florida's Unnatural Disaster, Charlie Crist, Taxpayers and the Next
Hurricane, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123371173
559046209.html [hereinafter Florida'sUnnaturalDisaster].
81. Press Release, State Farm, State Farm Florida Plans to Discontinue Property
InsuranceLines (Jan. 27, 2009), availableat http://www.floir.com/pdflSFFloridaPressRelease.
pdf [hereinafter State Farm Press Release].
82. Id.
83. Florida'sUnnaturalDisaster,supra note 80.
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The primary danger in all of this is that State Farm is more of the
rule than the exception. The state-fixed price caps have also resulted in
Prudential, Allstate, Nationwide, USAA, and others discontinuing their
current policies.84 Instead of having insurers compete to offer the lowest
rates, now the insurance companies are retreating from Florida and only
covering the least risky properties, if they are willing to cover any at all.
This creates a secondary problem. If State Farm and the other major
insurance companies continue to alienate their Florida customers, then
Citizens will continue to rapidly accumulate more customers,
concentrating even more risk into the state's largest insurer.
In conclusion, all three pillars of Florida's hurricane insurance
system are now in trouble after taking on too much risk without
adequate funding. The benefits of artificially low rates are only shortterm, leaving major problems for the Cat Fund, Citizens, and the
restricted private insurance market. With Florida's insurance problems
set, the unnatural disaster could be only one hurricane away.
D. Florida's Worst Case Scenario,How the DisasterCould Unfold
Imagine it is Hurricane Andrew all over again, but this time with a
twist. A category five hurricane chums directly through Miami or
Tampa Bay, causing roof failure on many residences and industrial
buildings, and some complete building failures. This hurricane would
cause all shrubs, trees, and signs to fall down, destroy mobile homes,
and cause major damage to structures located less than fifteen feet
above sea level.
Such a hurricane would cost Floridians between $183 and $198
billion in total damages according to the Florida's Department of
Financial Services.86 This would far surpass the damage caused by
Hurricane Katrina, the costliest single hurricane in the United States to
date. Out of that damage, $90 billion would come from insured
property damage, split into $60.9 billion residential property losses, and
the rest in commercial property losses.8 8
Now that we know how the storm could play out, there is only one
remaining question: how would the current Florida insurance system
handle this scenario? Many experts believe that if a major hurricane or a
84. Id.
85. National Weather Service Hurricane System, The Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind
Scale, availableat http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/sshws.shtml (last visited on Aug. 24, 2009).
86. DFS REPORT, supra note 4, at 2.
87. Id. Damages would affect residential structures, personal property, commercial
property, utilities, agriculture, and government structures and land. Approximately 41% of the
total loss would be borne by insurance companies. Id.
88. Id.
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series of minor hurricanes were to hit Florida today, Florida's hurricane
insurance system would fail, resulting in valid insurance claims going
unpaid. 8 9 This section specifically dissects each of the three pillars
holding up the insurance system: the Cat Fund, Citizens, and the private
insurance market. In the event of such a failure, the Cat Fund would be
the first pillar to fall, with a projected deficit of $11.4 billion. 90 The Cat
Fund is required to cover $29 billion of the first $60 billion in damage,
while the total funding capacity of the Cat Fund in 2009 was only $17.6
billion. 91 There are two options to resolve this debt: (1) raise money
through post-event bonding, or (2) default on the debt.
Post-event bonding was the main tool intended to make the Cat Fund
function. However, in light of the current credit crisis, the Cat Fund
Advisory Council reported, "post-event bonding may not be sufficient
to fund the Cat Fund's total deficient [in 2009]."92 This is an
understatement at best because the largest post-event bonding issuance
in history was less than $10 billion and was made during good
economic times. 93 Considering the current financial markets, the postevent bonding capacity is likely to be closer to $0 than $10 billion. This
leaves the last option: failure and default. This would force the Cat Fund
to forsake insurance guarantees owed to many policyholders of Citizens
and private companies alike.
The next pillar to fall would be Citizens, which will need to cover
$23.55 billion in this worse-case scenario. 94 In addition, Citizens
depends on the Cat Fund for a total of $11.22 billion in payments. 9 5
Without the Cat Fund's ability to pay up, Citizens would have almost no
other option but to declare a bankruptcy of sorts.
Assuming arguendo that the Cat Fund was able to pay in full and on
time, Citizens on its own would still be expected to cover $9.27 billion
of the estimated $60.86 billion. 96 However, with its current budget
89. See Florida Insurance Council, supra note 16; see also DFS REPORT, supra note 4, at
15. "If the Cat Fund cannot deliver, Florida policyholders .... could see their claims go unpaid
altogether." Florida Insurance Council, supra note 16.
90. St. John, supra note 7, at Bl. Some, including Florida's Central Financial Officer,
have estimated that the financial shortage is $20.07 billion, a much larger amount. DFS REPORT,
supra note 4, at 17.
91. St. John, supra note 7.
92. Florida Cabinet Meeting, State Bd. of Admin. Asset Update (Apr. 14, 2009), at
http://www.myflorida.com/myflorida/cabinet/agenda09/0414/audioindex.html
(Statement of
Ash Williams, Executive Dir. of the State Bd. of Admin.).
93. Hays Interview, supra note 74.
94.

DFS REPORT, supra note 4, at 17.

95. Id.
96. Id. The amount of $9.27 billion is determined by taking the $23.55 billion estimated
gross total loss and subtracting the $11.22 billion in Cat Fund Payments and the $3.06 billion in
policyholder deductible payments. Id.
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limited to $6.75 billion funding capacity, Citizens would have a
projected $2.52 billion deficit. That deficit would require Citizens to
issue the largest assessments ever made on Florida's insurance
consumers.9 7
The private market would be the last pillar to fall. With a dried up
Cat Fund, "nearly every insurance company operating in the state will
come up short."9 Bolstering this claim is the fact that the Cat Fund's
$17.8 billion in coverage owed to private insurance companies is its last
priority because the Cat Fund is not statutorily responsible if it defaults
on the private insurers. 99 This means that the private insurance market,
which was statutorily required to pay into the Cat Fund, would be left
empty-handed in the aftermath.' 00
So if the "Big One" hits Florida, the first to go is the Cat Fund. Then
without the Cat Fund being able to cover its required policies, its
dependents, Citizens and the private insurance market, would then soon
deplete their resources. Thus, as detailed above, "Florida's gambit to
reduce insurance rates could bankrupt the state, paralyze its economy,
and leave tens of thousands homeless without money to rebuild."'
IV. SOUTH CAROLINA'S CONSERVATIVE PRIVATE MARKET MODEL

Florida and South Carolina are on opposite ends of the spectrum
when it comes to hurricane insurance. The core difference is that South
Carolina lawmakers believe that the private insurance market is better
than the government at repairing coastal insurance problems.102 South
Carolina's strong focus on letting the private industry run the majority
of the state's insurance system allows it to sidestep many of the policy

97. Id. at 24-25. Citizens has three tiers for debt recovery: (Tier 1) Citizens Policyholder
Surcharge, (Tier 2) regular assessments, and (Tier 3) emergency assessments. Id. Each tier is
designed for different amounts of debt, which allows Citizens to differ on who they charge, how
long they charge, and how much they charge. Id. at 24-25.
98. Paige St. John, Is Floridain Danger of Going Bankrupt?, SARASOTA HERALD-TmRn.,
Oct. 4, 2008, available at http://www.gainesville.com/article/20081004/NEWS/810059993/l/
SPORTSO I 02?Title=IsFlorida in danger of going bankrupt [hereinafter FloridaDanger].
99. Interview with Patrick F. Maroney, Dir. of Fla. Catastrophic Storm Risk Management
Center and FSU's Kathryn Magee Kip Professor and Former Assoc. Dean for Graduate
Programs within the Coll. of Bus. (Apr. 28, 2009) [hereinafter Maroney Interview].
100. DFS REPORT, supra note 4, at 25. For those who are forced to declare bankruptcy, the
burden would be carried back to all the remaining insurers. The remaining insurance debt after
bankruptcy would be distributed through a government program to all insurance agencies after
bankruptcy. This would further increase rates for policyholders. See generally id.
101. FloridaDanger,supra note 98.
102. In turn, this spreads the risk among many insurance companies, rather than
concentrating risk under one state government program.
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decisions Florida faces in controlling a government-led insurance
system.
While most southern coastal states turned to more governmentcentered policies in response to Hurricane Katrina, South Carolina's
Governor Mark Sanford, decided to "unleash [private] market
forces."10 During the same time period, Governor Sanford launched a

successful and comprehensive legislative package, the 2007 Omnibus
Coastal Property Insurance Reform.' 04 When asked why he did not go
for a more government-based insurance system, he replied, "I looked at
it and I saw that fear was largely driving the agenda. . .. I wanted to do

something different." 0 5
Now South Carolina relies on four main policies to keep its private
insurance market healthy: (1) preserve the state-run insurer as a true
insurer of last resort, (2) offer tax exemptions for private insurers
willing to cover the riskiest properties, (3) offer tax exemptions to
individual citizens to encourage hurricane preparation, and (4) refrain
from creating a state-run reinsurance program.
The first and arguably most important policy is to preserve the South
Carolina Wind and Hail Underwriting Association (SC Wind Pool) as
an insurer of last resort. The SC Wind Pool is the rough equivalent of
Florida's Citizens. In South Carolina, the SC Wind Pool is truly a
market of last resort, with average rates 35% higher than in the private
market.106 The SC Wind Pool's own policy documents clearly state that
their "rates will be higher than the standard market."' 0 7 As a result, the
SC Wind Pool is adequately funded and generally returns a profit for
the state. os This is a complete contrast to Florida's Citizens, which has
had deep deficits twice in the last five years, and is still attempting to
recover by charging increased rates on all of Florida's insurance
customers. 109
The second policy on which South Carolina relies is a tax exemption
given to insurance companies to attract more companies to write coastal
property insurance. This tax exemption is only offered to insurance
companies that write full coverage policies to homeowners in the
riskiest coastal areas." 0
103. Lehrer, supra note 58, at 2.
104. See generally id.
105. Id. at 7.
106. Unlikely Homeowner DroppedBy InsuranceCompany!, availableat http://www.total
injury.com/news/articles/insurance/homeowners-insurance.aspx (last visited June 9, 2010)
[hereinafter Unlikely Homeowner].
107. Lehrer, supra note 58, at 8, 15. Still, some would go further, and say that the SC
Wind Pool should never serve anyone capable of finding any private market coverage.
108. Id. at 15.
109. Florida Insurance Council, supra note 16.
110. Lehrer, supra note 58, at 11.
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Since South Carolina implemented its first and second policies,
private insurers have returned to the state's coastal property areas.
Allstate has announced that it will accept 2,300 policies it once declared
"canceled," and now State Farm and Farm Bureau are taking parallel
action to increase business and competition in South Carolina."' In
contrast to South Carolina, Florida's largest private insurer has
announced plans for a complete withdrawal from the state. 1 2
South Carolina's third policy is the creation of "Disaster Savings
Accounts," which offer income tax exemptions directly to coastal
property owners who deposit their money in savings accounts for the
purpose of hurricane preparedness." 3 The policy was primarily created
for the purpose of giving property owners an alternative to insurance b
saving money themselves through the government's implicit support.'
The Disaster Savings Accounts also provides up to an impressive
eleven-percent return for the first year by adding the seven- Percent
income tax waiver to a four-percent interest savings account." Thus,
for some homeowners, the Disaster Savings Accounts will actually be a
better option than formal insurance.116
This policy truly highlights the differences between the hurricane
insurance policies of Florida and South Carolina. When insurance rates
get high, the trend in Florida is to transfer risk from the private market
to the state's insurance system, whereas South Carolina empowers the
individual homeowner to transfer some of the risk to himself or herself

111. Id. at9.
112. State Farm Press Release, supranote 81, at 1.
113. Lehrer, supra note 58, at 12.
114. See id. This policy also rewards homeowners with insurance in the same way, but for
the purpose of helping insureds with hurricane deductibles, which are often expensive. See id.
115. Id.
116. See id.
Disaster savings accounts . .. may provide an additional incentive for people to
purchase private insurance. . . . To illustrate, consider the following scenario:
An insurance policy with a high deductible, all other things being equal, will
cost less than one with a lower deductible. An insurance company can always
make a policy affordable by raising the deductible or requiring co-insurance. If
the deductible or co-insurance gets too high, however, a policy may not provide
a real benefit to somebody who purchases it, since a policy with a deductible
larger than an individual's liquid savings still leaves a homeowner unable to
pay for damages without going into debt or selling assets intended for future
use. At the margin, savings accounts designated for the disaster changes
homeowners' calculus, making it somewhat easier for them to accept higher
deductible insurance policies.
Id.
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in light of high insurance rates. However, because Florida has no
income tax, it would be impossible to implement an identical program.
The South Carolina's fourth policy is to refrain from hosting a
government-run reinsurance program.
Arguably, the backbone of
Florida's insurance system is the Cat Fund reinsurance program, which
requires insurers to purchase a fixed proportional amount of
reinsurance. The South Carolina plan allows insurers to seek
reinsurance anywhere, including out of the state. This allows the South
Carolina insurance market to better spread the risk, which would
dampen ay financial shock from storm damage and lower rates in the
long run.
Taken together, these four policies share the common goal of
reducing high insurance rates by promoting competition in the private
market with minimal government involvement. As South Carolina's
former insurance commissioner explained: "Overregulation does not
drive rates down, [but] .

. .

. [i]t has the reverse effect. It does the exact

opposite of what the legislature wants to happen, which is to drive rates
up."'
V. FLORIDA'S FUTURE MODEL, THE
"GLIDE PATH" TO SUSTAINABILITY

Florida has its own unique priorities different from that of every
other state, so what works best for one state is not necessarily what
works best for Florida. Specifically, Florida's differences stem from its
heavier stake in coastal interest. Florida has nearly 1200 miles of
coastline to protect,1 20 over six times as much coastline compared to
South Carolina's 187 miles.121 Along with the abundant miles of
coastline, Florida's general economy and tourism are heavily attached
to the coast.122 To protect those high priorities, Florida's insurance
system needs moderate control to promptly adapt to changes in the
market.
117. This fact was inferred from reading a plethora of documents and conducting a Google
search on South Carolina Hurricane Insurance that garnered no references or successful results.
118. Id. at 15.
119. Jeff Ostrowski, South CarolinaSpared Insurance Woes, PALM BEACH PosT, Feb. 9,
2003, available at http://www.palmbeachpost.com/business/content/business/insurance-woes.
html.
120. StateOfFlorida.com, Florida Quick Facts, at http://www.stateofflorida.com/Portall
DesktopDefault.aspx?tabid=95 (last visited Jan. 24, 2010).
121. South Carolina Department of Parks, Recreation, and Tourism, Fast Facts about
South Carolina, at http://www.seprt.com/facts-figures/geographyclimateeconomy.aspx (last
visited Jan. 24, 2010).
122. See Graditor,supra note 6, at 537-38.
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Both of those two qualities are the drawbacks to a private marketdriven insurance system. Admittedly, South Carolina's insurance
system is characterized by less control and implementation delay
because of the decentralized nature of sharing control among many
insurers.123 However, Florida's current unfunded system is not working
either. Between 2006 and 2009, the Cat Fund's exposure has greatly
increased without proper funding, and Citizens' rates as well as private
market rates have been artificially decreased. Thus, all three pillars of
Florida's insurance system are inadequate. The alternative is to create a
glide path to a more conservative insurance system that lies between the
current South Carolina and Florida policies. "This crisis did not occur
overnight and we cannot fix it overnight but the state needs to make the
necessary changes to protect our state and citizens."' 24
The glide path proposals consist of the three core policy shifts that
can be summed up as the three R's of Florida's hurricane insurance: (1)
Restrict Cat Fund exposure, (2) Return Citizens to an insurer of last
resort, and (3) Reduce regulation on the private market.
A. Restrict Cat FundExposure
To restrict the Cat Fund's exposure, Florida lawmakers must
implement two reforms to the current Cat Fund. First, the Cat Fund's
liability should be cut to its original level of $16 billion. Second, the
cost of reimbursement premiums for insurers should be raised to
provide additional pre-event funding. By reducing its coverage and
increasing its capital, the Cat Fund would revert to a much more stable
and manageable risk.
A long-term solution is necessary to implement the first reform. The
Cat Fund should be reduced by $4 billion each year starting on June 1,
2010. A "stair-step" implementation will dampen the shock to the
insurance market, and provide adequate time for insurers to seek
reinsurance elsewhere. By roughly 2013, the Cat Fund could return to
its original and reasonable risk coverage of $16 billion.
The 2007 reform that extended the Cat Fund to $29 billion is the
crux of the unnatural disaster; it has exponentially contributed to
Florida's problems. Though South Carolina has a robust hurricane
insurance market without any form of government reinsurance, the

123. Unlikely Homeowner, supra note 106. Ironically, South Carolina's Insurance Director
has been dropped by his private insurer, and will likely be left with no option but to turn to the
government-run wind pool. Id.
124. Press Release, Associated Industries of Florida, Assoc. Indus. of Fla. Participates in
Bi-partisan, Coal. Press Conference to Discuss Florida's Prop. Ins. Crisis (Apr. 3, 2009) (quote
from Rep. Long).
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majority of South Carolina's population resides in non-coastal areas.125
To treat these unique problems, Florida's Cat Fund has and should
continue to offer the advantage of lower hurricane insurance rates
through cheap reinsurance. To achieve a workable balance, Florida
should limit its investment in reinsurance to a sustainable amount: $16
billion.126 The current situation in 2009 has made it abundantly clear
that the Cat Fund cannot pay out what it has promised. Though there
will be many years in which the Cat Fund can cover much more than
$16 billion, there will also be years in which it cannot, and consistency
and consumer confidence are imperative factors in the insurance
industry.
The second reform to the Cat Fund requires the OIR Commissioner
to increase the amount of premium payments the Cat Fund exacts from
primary insurers. The new rate should be left for the commissioner to
determine using guidelines to keep Florida's risk at a reasonable level to
adequately cover a 1-in-100 year hurricane. This would garner more
funding of the Cat Fund pre-event, while simultaneously requiring more
from those who will benefit from the Cat Fund. In return, the Cat Fund
will be more stable, and less dependent on outside funding from the
bond market and policy assessments. Both of these policies will further
sustain the Cat Fund making it more stable than it has ever been.
B. Return Citizens to an InsurerofLast Resortl 27

The next major policy goal is to reduce Citizens to its original role as
Florida's insurer of last resort. This can be done with three simple
reforms. First, Citizens must remove all policyholders who are eligible
to receive a "reasonable" offer from a private insurance company.
Second, Citizens must return its rates to an actuarially sound level.
Third, Citizens should place a two-to-one ratio cap on assessing nonCitizens customers.
This first reform will shift Citizens back to its pre-2007 structure by
removing policyholders who are eligible to receive a "reasonable" offer
from the private market. "Reasonable" offer should be defined as an
offer within twenty percent of the current Citizens rate, or an offer equal
to or below the true internal actuarial cost of the Citizens policy. This
should be done immediately by soliciting private insurance offers on all
of Citizens' policies. Once the qualified policies have been determined,
125. See ZINN, supra note 1.
126. Maroney Interview, supra note 99.
127. The proposed reforms under this section largely came from my interviews with
Representatives Hays and Proctor. In addition, many ideas stemmed from HB 1495, including
the discussions and questions it raised before being passed by the Florida Legislature during the
2009 regular session.
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those policyholders would receive a letter informing them of the
available offer or offers. The letter should inform the individual that his
or her policy will be discontinued within six months of receiving the
notice, with the caveat that policies cannot be discontinued during or
two months prior to hurricane season.
As an insurer of last resort, Citizens should not cover those who are
eligible for a reasonable quote from the private market. Thus Citizens
should continue to only protect those who are truly dependent on it for
insurance, thereby limiting Florida's exposure to risk.
The second reform would be to return Citizens' rates to an
actuarially sound level. This should be accomplished by raising
Citizens' rates by no more than ten percent each year for each coastal
region, and by no more than twenty percent for any individual policy.
Rate increases should continue until Citizens becomes actuarially

sound.128
Citizens' own executive, Christine Turner, called Citizens' current
rates woefully inadequate at forty to fifty-five percent below the
actuarially sound standard.19 As State Representative Alan Hays said,
"How can you with a clear conscience . . . have (policyholders) believe
that the current rates should be continued? . . . What good does it do

them to buy something that is no good in the long run? I consider the
perpetuation of this rate freeze to be wrong." 30
Lawmakers selected a ten percent price increase cap because of
historical outcries suggesting that larger percentage would be rejected
by the electorate. Given the current inadequacy and the rising annual
cost, it may take many years for Citizens' policies to reach an
actuarially sound level.
The third reform would limit the amount of assessments that can be
placed on non-Citizens customers by a two to one ratio. This would
mean that for any assessment issued, Citizens' policyholders would
have to pay at least twice as much of the assessment as noncitizens
policyholders. This would create more accountability by keeping
assessments more isolated for those in a coastal region. However, inland
residents would still be required to cover their fair share of the
128. See generally Editorial, Hurricane Precautions: Is Florida Prepared?, LAKELAND
LEDGER, May 19, 2009, available at http://www.theledger.com/article/20090519/NEWS/
A bill passed during
905185073/1036?Title=Hurricane-Precautions-Is-Florida-Prepared.
Florida's regular session to return Citizens' rates back to an actuarially sound level, subject to a
10% per year increase price cap. Id.
129. Josh Hafenbrack, Senate Insurance Package Suffers Setbacks, SUN-SENTINEL (Ford
Lauderdale, Fla.), Apr. 1, 2009, available at http://www.taylor.house.gov/index.php?option=
comcontent&task-view&id=529&Itemid=36.
130. Paul Flemming, Citizens Insurance Rate Vote Today in Florida House (Apr. 24,
57
&ltem
2009), http://www.taylor.house.gov/index.php?option-com-content&task-view&id-6
id=36.
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detriment when benefiting from the state's economy. If implemented,
these three proposals would return Citizens to a stable insurer of last
resort, increase accountability, and more effectively shield non-Citizens
customers from financial loss.
C. Reduce Rate Regulation on the PrivateMarket
The last major policy goal is to reduce rate restrictions on the private
market through two simple reforms. First, OIR should not be allowed to
regulate the rates offered by private insurers. Second, Florida should
adopt a tax exemption for those insurers that write policies in Citizenseligible areas.
The first reform would be to simply revoke all statutes pertaining to
price regulation for homeowner's multiperil insurance, and all other
types of insurance related to hurricanes. Regulation would still exist for
other rating factors, subject to the unfair trade practices statute. Upon
being signed into law, any new policies written would be subject to this
reform. However, to dampen the shock that Floridians would likely
experience due to rapid rate increases, existing policies would be
subject to a twenty percent rate increase limit per year.
After five years, all policy rates would be completely set by market
forces rather than government regulation. However, it is still a
forbidden act in Florida to increase insurance rates, so the twenty
percent rate increase limit would provide some restraint to create a
sufficient balance to facilitate legislative compromise. The most
significant benefit of this reform would be retention of Florida's current
insurers and the possible addition of new ones. State Farm has publicly
announced that with this reform, it would keep its 1.2 million policies in
Florida.' 3 ' Without having arbitrary price restrictions, insurers would be
able to insure riskier properties. Over time, this practice would steal
away more and more policyholders from Citizens.
Under the second reform, Florida would adopt a version of the South
Carolina insurer tax exemptions for private insurance companies that
write full policies in areas eligible for Citizens coverage. The tax
exemptions would only apply to state taxes, but would still offer a
significant incentive. Thus, both private market rate-reduction reforms
would encourage current insurers to write more policies, and bring new
insurers to the state.
The implementation of all seven glide path proposals would swing
the pendulum toward a more conservative insurance system, affecting
all four categories mentioned in the previous section. Most importantly,
131. See Jeff Ostrowski, Other Insurers Poised to Pick Up State Farm's Slack, PAUm
BEACH PosT, Feb. 13, 2009, available at http://www.palmbeachpost.com/politics/content/
business/epaper/2009/02/13/0213statefarm.html.
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the effects of these proposals limit government involvement in the
market, thus creating a freer market for private industry and
competition. Though these proposals will undoubtedly improve
Florida's insurance industry in the long run, they will not be
implemented in time for the forthcoming hurricane season. If a major
hurricane hit today, the only hope for Florida would be the federal
government.

VI. PROPOSED

NATIONAL SOLUTIONS

"[W]hen a risk is so large that the insurance market and individual
states can't reasonably bear it, it's the role of the federal government to
step in, as we've done to insure against acts of terrorism. Because when
a catastrophe strikes, we all look out for one another," said President
Obama when speaking about hurricane insurance during the 2008
presidential campaign. 2 Like President Obama, some people see the
risk and problems of hurricane insurance as too large for the single
states to handle on their own, and as an alternative prefer some form of
national assistance.
In today's federal political climate, the relevant question is not
whether to provide assistance; the real question is framed as "how."
There has been a growing trend to increase federal disaster financial
assistance following catastrophes, and this trend reached an apex in the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, when the government handed out $114
billion in general aid.' 33 Much of the federal aid went to replace damage
that would otherwise be covered by hurricane insurance.
Moreover, the federal government is currently reaching
unprecedented levels of spending and involvement in all contexts of
government.134 Congress and the President signed an annual budget for
2009-2010 that is 15% larger than every previous budget passed by
Congress.'3 5 This appropriations agreement is in addition to an

132. Barack Obama, Spread Risk with National Disaster Fund, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Sept. 7, 2008, availableat http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/essays/article79858 .ece.
133. Thomas A. Bowden, Before and After HurricaneKatrina: How Government Makes
Disasters More Disastrous,CAPITALISM MAG., Apr. 30, 2008, availableat http://www.capmag.
com/article.asp?ID=5174.
134. Binyamin Appelbaum et al., Geithner Asks Congressfor BroadPower to Seize Firms,
WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2009/03/24/AR2009032400847.html.
135. Jason Morgan, Obama's Historic U.S. Federal Government Budget: How Bad is It?,
http://www.babeled.com/2009/03/28/historical-us-federal2009,
28,
Mar.
BABELED,
government-budget-analysis- 1981 -to-2008/.
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automaker bailout in December 2008,136 and a $700 billion financial
sector bailout in October 2008.137
With all this momentum favoring federal involvement, it seems
almost certain that the federal government will extend financial aid in
some form if a hurricane ravages Florida or another state this hurricane
season. The question of how the federal government should help in this
context is split into three main categories: ad hoc national assistance, a
national catastrophe fund, or a national bridge loan.
A. Ad Hoc NationalAssistance
The "Air Force One Plan" is a commonly known federal response to
crises. After a major crisis occurs, the U.S. President declares a state of
emergency, and then flies in to save the day by distributing billions of
dollars in aid.138 According to the L.A. Times, the national government
has already created a steady supply of catastrophe assistance "since the
1970s, Washington has emerged as the insurer of last resort against
floods, fires, earthquakes and . . . terrorist attacks."' 3 9 Recently, the
government came to save the day by giving $6.3 billion in response to
the 1993 flood of the Northern Mississippi River,140 $7.24 billion in
federal funds following the Northridge Earthquake in California,141 and
$40 billion in aid following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. 4 2
136. Jeffrey McCracken et al., Bankruptcy Leads Possible Plansfor GM Chrysler, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 30, 2009, availableat http://online.wsj.com/article/SBl23841609048669495.html.
137. David M. Herszenhorn, Bailout Plan Wins Approval; Democrats Vow Tighter Rules,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/04/business/economy/
04bailout.html?ref-us.
138. Delegal Interview, supra note 10; see FEMA.gov. Number of Declarations per
Calendar Year Since 1999, http://www.fema.gov/govemment/grant/pa/statl.shtm (last visited on
Aug. 24, 2009). "Emergency" is loosely defined by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) as
[a]ny occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President,
Federal assistance is needed to supplement State and local efforts and
capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or
to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States.
Id.
139. Peter G. Gosselin & Alan C. Miller, Why FEMA was Missing in Action, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 5, 2005, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/washingtondc/la-nafema5sep05,0,2040037.story.
140. Id.
141. Thomas A. Garrett & Russell S. Sobel, The PoliticalEconomy of FEMA Disaster
Payments, 41 EcoN. INQUIRY 496, 498 (2003), available at http://www.be.wvu.edu/divecon/
econ/SobelAll%20Pubs%20PDF/Te%20Political%20Economy%200f %20FEMA%20Disaster
%20Payments.pdf.
142. Gosselin & Miller, supra note 139.
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In 2004, Congress also approved $13.6 billion to help cover the cost of
four hurricanes.1 43 However, Hurricane Katrina alone absorbed $114
billion of federal taxpayers' money.
In the trend of growing federal disaster aid, Congress has passed a
bill that gives the President $2 billion per year to spend on catastrophes
without any further approval from Congress.' 4 5 For the President to
exceed the $2 billion limit, Congress must expressly approve the
appropriations.14 6
This is the least desirable option because it is ad hoc with no limits,
no guidelines, no accountability, and no ability to prepare for the regular
shocks that hurricanes require. Sending $10 billion or more to Florida
every time a major hurricane hits is a poor solution for Florida and the
rest of the American public. People in less risk-prone areas, such as
Iowa, should not have to subsidize the cost of living on the coast in
Palm Beach. At the same time, the person in Palm Beach is then
encouraged to purchase property in hurricane-prone areas. 147 Many
people would agree that this option is not beneficial for a majority of
Americans, and if the federal government is going to get involved, then
it should ascertain a better way. Historically, ad hoc national assistance
has been the default option, but there are two more options currently in
congressional debate.
B. National CatastropheFundl48
Though a National Catastrophe Fund (NCF) has been introduced and
143. Gilbert M. Gaul & Ceci Connolly, Cost of Katrina is Expected to Break Records,
WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2005/08/3 1/AR2005083102395.html.
144. See Bowden, supra note 133.
145. See generally CRS Congressional Report, Elizabeth Bazan, Robert T. Stafford
DisasterRelief and Emergency Assistance Act: Legal Requirementsfor Federaland State Roles
in Declarationsof an Emergency or a Major Disaster, Order Code RL33090 (2005), available
at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/53688.pdf. Once a state governor has requested
that the President declare a state of emergency, the president is then authorized to offer financial
aid for rebuilding. Id at 4. This assistance would come in the form of FEMA funds. Given that
Obama hand-picked FEMA's leader from Florida's division of emergency management,
Florida's FEMA-equivalent, FEMA would likely be amenable to hurricane relief. Id. at 10.
146. Id.
147. This is distinguished from the State of Florida justification example because the
economic connection is exponentially more attenuated than it was as an internal state issue.
148. A regional Cat Fund would operate similarly. Southeastern states would pool together
to create something like a "Gulf States Compact." CivicConcern.org, The Property Insurance
Crisis: Have We Made Progress . . . Or Are We Worse Off than Before?, http://civicconcern.
org/issues/insurance/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2010). The compact would include all states willing to
join, possibly covering all nine Southeastern states from Texas to Virginia. Id. One Florida
Cabinet Member has already started a dialogue with insurance commissioners from other Gulf
States. Id. However, the regional Cat Fund only exists in idea form. Id.
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received preliminary support in Congress, it has never been adopted. If
created, most expect an NCF to provide reinsurance similar to the
Florida Cat Fund but on a national scale for all disasters, including:
hurricanes, earthquakes, mudslides, tornadoes, and blizzards.149 With a
government-backed financial safety net, insurance companies lower
their rates. This would be especially helpful for areas with the most
uncertainty where rates have skyrocketed in recent years amid natural
disasters.
The concept of an NCF has been gaining momentum in congress,
and currently there is one active bill. 15 The Multiple Peril Insurance
Act of 2009 was introduced on March 3, 2009 to amend the National
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and to provide coverage for damage
resulting from winds and floods. 52 This basic concept has already been
put into bill form and passed the House and Senate in 2007 and 2008,
respectively.15 3 Nevertheless, the two chambers could not resolve their
differences, largely due to President Bush's veto threat, which
prevented the law from being officially ratified.154 However, the new
Multiple Peril Insurance Act of 2009 is still alive and may have a
different fate with a different president. President Obama has previously
announced his general approval of a national catastrophe fund. 5 5
1. Federal Reinsurance Precedent: The NFIP
In 1968, the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) was
established as a result of frequent flooding of the Mississippi River. 5 6

149. See Homeowners' Defense Act of 2009, S. 505, 111th Cong. (2009), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=slll-505 (last visited Jan. 24, 2010)
[hereinafter S. 505].
150. Gramlich, supra note 40.
151. See Multiple Peril Insurance Act of 2009, H.R. 1264, 111th Cong. (2009), available
at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill. xpd?bill=hl 11-1264 (last visited Mar. 19, 2010).
152. Id.
153. H.R. 3121, supra note 12.
154. Mark Halperin, Obama Camp Release on McCain's Opposition to National
Catastrophic InsuranceFund, TIME MAG., available at http://thepage.time.com/obama-camprelease-on-mccains-opposition-to-national-catastrophic-insurance-fund/ (last visited May 17,
2009); see generally H.R. 3121, supra note 12. "[T]he Bush Adminsitration came out against a
National Catastrophic Insurance. . . ." Halperin, supra.
155. Obama, supra note 132. "And because future hurricanes and other natural disasters
will challenge us again, it's time to come together as Americans and create a common-sense
national catastrophe insurance system, so that no family, neighborhood, city or state is left to
bear the full burden of these events alone." Id.
156. Insurance Information Institute, Flood Insurance, http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/
insurance/flood/?tablesort_771043=8&printerfriendly=yes (last visited Mar. 19, 2010).
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[The NFIP] is a Federal program enabling property owners in
participating communities to purchase insurance as a protection
against losses from flooding. This insurance is designed to
provide an insurance alternative to disaster assistance to meet the
escalating costs of repairing damage to buildings and their
contents caused by floods.1 7
The NFIP was designed in a reaction to the rising cost of ad hoc taxpayer-funded relief for flood victims.15 8 Before the NFIP, many people
could not obtain flood coverage from insurance companies because of
the degree of risk and corresponding high cost.' 59 The NFIP now mostly
operates through private insurers using the "Write Your Own" program
in which a pool of insurance companies issue specific pre-determined
policies and handle claims on behalf of the NFIP.160 However, the
federal government retains responsibility for underwriting losses, and as
of 2007, the NFIP carried over 5.6 million policies.161
The NCF could be structured like the NFIP, because both would
likely serve as a federal underwriter for policies written by private
insurance companies, and both would address the same two main
problems. The first problem is that general federal disaster relief is
already subsidizing some of the cost of hurricane insurance, as it did for
flood insurance in the 1960s. The second problem is the program's high
demand, which is due to the unwillingness of private insurers to write
policies for the riskiest hurricane-prone coastal properties. Notably,
insurers were also unwilling to write policies for the riskiest flood-prone
properties in the 1960s.
Moreover, the NFIP and the NCF would also likely share similar
criticisms. The main NFIP criticism stems from its inadequate rates,
which have resulted in a $23.5 billion debt owed to the U.S.
Treasury.162 A majority of this debt was caused by Hurricanes Katrina,
Rita, and Wilma during the 2005 storm season.163 In 2009, interest
157. FEMA.gov, National Flood Insurance Program/Foodplain Management, http://www.
fema.gov/hazard/hurricane/2005katrina/hmp/nfipfloodplain.shtm (last visited Mar. 19, 2010).
158. Insurance Information Institute, supra note 156.
159. Mississippi Coastal Mapping Project, NFIP Overview, available at http://www.ms
coastalmapping.com/nfipOverview.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2010).
160. Insurance Information Institute, supra note 156.
16 1. Id.
162. David R. Conrad, Senior Water Res. Specialist of Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, The State of
the NFIP and Flood Policies - A System of Risk Management - Is it Time for a Change?,
Presentation at the ABA 34th Annual Spring Conference on the Environment Baltimore, MD,
June
19,
2006,
http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:DTKNofxYRsJ:www.abanet.org/
publicserv/environmental/conference/davidconrad_34thconf presentation.ppt+20+billion+debt
+NFIP&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.
163. See id.
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payments on NFIP's debt service cost over $1 billion annually, which
consumed roughly half of all NFIP's revenues.1 64 "Without a bailout
[the] NFIP will collapse."l 6 5 The same criticism is true for Florida's Cat
Fund: the government simply cannot host reinsurance fund without
going into debt. The Cat Fund went into a deficit in 2006 and had to
borrow almost $2 billion to operate.166 The debt service from those
bonds is currently being collected through emergency assessments
across Florida and will continue to be collected until 2015.167 Since the
NCF's closest predecessors, both the NFIP and Florida's Cat Fund have
declared some form of bankruptcy, a new NCF would likely follow suit.
2. A Step in the Wrong Direction
People are opposed to a NCF for various reasons. Many believe that
the private insurance market is capable of handling hurricane risk
without government intrusion.' 6 8 Still, some also argue that because
insurance has traditionally been a state issue, it should remain so for the
sake of precedent.' 69 Like the Sierra Club, some people believe a NCF
would create a perverse incentive to continue to build in risky areas. 170
The largest issue would be whether a NCF could withstand the
political pressure. In other words, could a NCF prevent itself from
becoming more of a bailout for risk-prone states, and could it continue
to charge and protect each state equally?' 7 ' This view is supported by
the fact that lobbying efforts are only being funded from high risk
states.172 Many organizations, including the American Insurance
Association, fear that just as Florida's Cat Fund has subsidized the cost
of living on the coast at the expense of inland taxpayers, an NCF would
cause similar problems on a national scale.' 7 3 The only difference would
be that this problem would divide states with little risk, such as
Wyoming and Utah, from states that are more prone to catastrophes,
164.
165.

Id.
Id.

166.

DFS REPORT, supra note 4, at 24.

167. Id. at 26.
168. Matt Brady, CAT Fund Backers Clash with AIA, National Underwriter Online News
Service, Jan. 19, 2006, http://www.myfloridacfo.com/pressoffice/Documents/CAT%20
Fund%20Backers%20Cash%2OWith%20AIA06.htm.
169. Elisabeth A. Ondera, Testing the Waters: South Carolina Coastal Captive Insurance
Act as Part of a Multifaceted Approach to the CoastalInsurance Conundrum, 59 S.C. L. REv.
599, 612 (2008).
170. Press Release, American Rivers, Americans for Smart Natural Catastrophe Policy
(Mar. 13, 2009), available at http://www.americanrivers.org/newsroom/press-releases/2009/
americans-for-smart-natural.html.
171. Delegal Interview, supra note 10.
172. Maroney Interview, supra note 99.
173. Brady, supra note 168.
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such as Florida with its hurricanes, and California with its earthquakes
and wildfires.174 Even if the NCF begins fair, there will be political
pressure to artificially lower the rates, while still demanding the
government to cover the same risk. Americans deserve a less politicized
system that will not tempt politicians to artificially drop rates to win a
close election in the short-run, while making Americans pay too much
for a failed program in the long-run.175
Though the greater weight of the current evidence seems to point
against creating an NCF, this issue is still unresolved, and the NCF will
likely be a major issue for Congress to debate over the next few years.
C. NationalBridge Loan
"Let's hope we don't have a storm," said Alex Sink, state's chief
financial officer. "Failing that," she said, "hope for a multibillion-dollar
... bailout. We have to recognize that if we have a big enough storm,

just like the guys in Wall Street . . . we'll be up there in Washington, hat
in hand."' 7 6
Though Ms. Sink may not have known it, she was lobbying for the
Homeowners Defense Act of 2009, S. 505, a proposed national bridge
loan sponsored by Florida's own Senator, Bill Nelson. 7 7 This is not the
first Homeowners Defense Act. In 2007, H.R. 3355 passed the House
with a strong 258 votes, but could not pass in the Senate.' 78 The new
2009 bill would create a "National Catastrophe Risk Consortium"
(NCRC), a bridge loan program that would serve as financial backstop
to provide low-interest loans to qualified reinsurance programs, such as
Florida's Cat Fund.179 Proponents of the loans emphasize that there is
no permanent funding being requested, but rather just a temporary line
of credit that would only be opened once eighty percent of a state's
claims-paying ability for covering a catastrophe was depleted.so Thus,
the only request is for loans, and only in very rare circumstances. The
loans would have to be paid back in full by a set time, and would accrue
interest at a rate three percent higher than marketable obligations of the

174. Garret & Sobel, supra note 141, at 498.
175. Delegal Interview, supra note 10.
176. FloridaDanger, supra note 98.
177. S. 505, supra note 149.
178. Homeowners' Defense Act of 2007, H.R. 3355, 110th Cong. (2007), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd? bill=hl 10-3355 (last visited Jan. 24, 2010).
179. Sen. Nelson Seeks U.S. Help on Florida HurricaneLosses, INS. J., Mar. 25, 2009,
available
at
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2009/03/25/99029.htm
[hereinafter Nelson Help]; see also S. 505, supranote 149.
180. Florida Cabinet Meeting, State Bd. of Admin. (Apr. 14, 2009) (Statement of Kevin
McCarty, Commission of Office of Insurance Regulation).
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U.S. Treasury.' 8 ' This could soon become law as the new version of this
bill, S. 505, is alive and ready for committee action.182
In the hopes of creating a bridge loan without getting congressional
approval, Florida is currently lobbying three other federal agencies in
Washington D.C.: the U.S. Treasury, the Federal Reserve Bank, and the
White House.' 83 Any of these could provide Florida the line of credit it
would need to make it out of the next hurricane season intact.
The U.S. Treasury was Florida's first target, but in April 2009, the
department refused to issue a line of credit to back up Florida's Cat
Fund without congressional approval.184 Florida also approached the
Federal Reserve Bank with the same request, and efforts remain
ongoing. Florida is not alone in this effort, as Louisiana, Texas, and
California are lobbying for the same assistance as well.186
In addition, Florida approached the White House, but President
Obama has not made an official authorization. However, back in 2007,
a then-Senator Obama claimed the H.R. 3355 bridge loan bill was a
"good start" and a strong sign for continued support.
Turning from politics to policy, the bridge loan appears to be the
best option offered considering that the federal government is almost
certain to step in with financial aid following a major hurricane
catastrophe. The federal government already subsidizes natural disasters
in risk areas through ad hoc national assistance, so why not create a
more organized way to distribute the financial aid? 8 8
In contrast to the other two previous federal options, Senator Nelson
explained that the national bridge loan would be a more "disciplined,
structured plan."'89 This program would give the government the least
amount of financial and political involvement because a loan contains
much fewer variables and policy decisions than an insurance policy. Out
of the three traditional loan-factors: principal, interest rate, and
amortization period, only the amortization period would need to be
181. S. 505, supra note 149.
182. Id.
183. Florida Cabinet Meeting, State Bd. of Admin. Asset Update (Apr. 28, 2009)
(Statement of Ash Williams, Executive Dir. of the State Bd. of Admin.).
184. William March, Cat Fund Denied Aid from U.S. Treasury, TAMPA TRIB., Apr. 9,
2009, available at http://www2.tbo.com/content/2009/apr/09/na-cat-fund-denied-aid-from-ustreasury/news-metrol.
185. Florida Cabinet Meeting, supra note 183.
186. Steve Bousquet, Better Lending Market Could Help Florida's Cat Fund, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMEs, Apr. 15, 2009.

187. National Association of Professional Insurance Agents, Obama Backs National Cat
Fund, McCain Opposes, available at http://www.pianet.com/IssuesOfFocus-/Hotlssues/natural
disaster/6-3-08-4.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2010).
188. Nelson Help, supra note 179.
189. Id.
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determined for a national bridge loan because the other two factors
would be pre-determined. The principal is pre-determined by the
amount of financial aid needed beyond eighty percent of a state's
claims-paying ability, and the rate of interest is pre-determined at
three percent above the treasury rate. This simplicity would likely depoliticize the process and create more accountability. Evidence shows
that this increased accountability would save federal taxpayer money by
reducing the gross amount of emergency aid given to state and local
governments after disasters.190
Ad hoc national assistance is practically certain to continue until the
federal government chooses to implement an NCF or a bridge loan
program.
VII. CONCLUSION
At the heart of the unnatural disaster is the eternal struggle between
short-term politics and long-term sustainability. Due to the governmentoriented nature of Florida's hurricane insurance system, there is a
temptation to over-expose and artificially lower rates for short-term
results. The problems have now compounded over the years to make the
state vulnerable, and now it is clear that Florida would not be able to
weather all possible hurricane scenarios. This means that some
insurance consumers may go empty-handed. Chief Financial Officer
Sink said it best at a recent Florida cabinet meeting: "we're almost
running out of time."l 9 1
Still, Floridians are not quite out of luck, at least not yet. Admittedly,
sweeping changes will not fix Florida's insurance system overnight, but
the glide path offers a sustainable future for the state's insurance system
while minimizing fiscal and political problems in the short-term.
Furthermore, even if Florida cannot act soon enough, the federal
government has at least three possible options to rescue the state's
insurance system. Thus, the Smith family still does not have any
definitive answers, but with the glide path they can have hope.

190. Tim Padgett, Storm Fallout:A FloridaExodus?, TIME MAG., Sept. 4, 2008, available
at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1838780,00.html.
191. Florida Cabinet Meeting, State Bd. of Admin. Asset Update (Apr. 14, 2009)
(Statement of Alex Sink, Central Finance Officer).

